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1 Introduction
This paper considers capacity reporting games in many-to-one matching markets. A matching market consists
of two finite and disjoint sets of agents, say medical interns and hospitals. Each hospital has a capacity that
limits the maximum number of interns it can employ. Each agent has a preference relation over the other
side of the market. A matching assigns interns to hospitals. The stability criterion is central in studies
concerning two-sided matching problems. The ability of a mechanism to achieve stable allocations is decisive
in its success and its endurance (see Roth and Sotomayor 1990 and Roth 2002). A matching is stable if it is
individually rational for hospitals and for interns and there is no unmatched hospital-intern pair such that
the intern prefers the hospital to her assignment and the hospital prefers the intern to one of its interns or
keeping a vacant position.
Unfortunately stable matchings are prone to different kinds of manipulation. Dubins and Freedman
(1981) show that hospital-optimal stable matching is manipulable via preferences. Roth (1982) shows that
no stable matching rule is immune to preference manipulation.1 Gale and Sotomayor (1985 a and b) study
preference manipulation under the hospital-optimal stable rule. Sönmez (1997a) shows that there is no stable
matching rule immune to capacity manipulation. Finally Sönmez (1999) show that no stable rule is immune
to manipulation by early contracting.
The intern-optimal and the hospital-optimal stable matching rules are of particular interest. They are
used in the United States and in the United Kingdom to match medical interns and hospitals (see Roth
1984, 1991, Roth and Peranson 1999, Niederle and Roth 2003). The hospital-intern model has also been used
to model school admissions. Balinski and Sönmez 1999 study the admissions to Turkish universities. The
preferences of the colleges are derived by the results of a public examination according to a publicly known
formula. Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003) consider primary and secondary school choice in the United
Stated. In many districts students are allocated to schools on the basis of priorities, that are determined
by the school district. Schools have not control over priorities, but they can manipulate their capacities.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2005) argue that manipulation via capacities is not only a theoretical
possibility: under-reporting of capacities was a source of major concern in the school choice program in NYC
before it was redesigned.
In the capacity reporting games studied here hospitals report their capacities and the outcome is deter-
mined according either to the hospital-optimal rule or to the intern-optimal rule. Information is complete.
Konishi and U¨nver (2006) observe that these games might fail to have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
They show that under strong-monotonicity in population, a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists and under
the intern-optimal matching rule truthful capacity reporting is a dominant strategy.2If the interests of one
side of the market are aligned truthful capacity reporting is a dominant strategy, too.
Our analysis complements and extends the work of Konishi and U¨nver (2006).3 We focus on the stability
of pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. We connect equilibrium stability and incentives in truthful
capacity reporting. If an hospital is part of a pair blocking some equilibrium outcome, then it has incentive
for under-reporting its true capacity. We provide conditions sufficient to guarantee the stability (and the
existence) of pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. The first one is acyclicity. Under acyclicity truthful
capacity reporting is a dominant strategy and every Nash equilibrium outcome is stable. Furthermore, under
acyclicity the stable set is a singleton (an extension of Eeckhout 2000 result). It is the minimal condition
able to guarantee the stability of Nash equilibrium outcome when the hospital-optimal stable rule is used.
There is an important difference between the two games. Under the hospital-optimal stable rule, capacity
1Alcalde and Barbera (1994) extend the result to individually rational and Pareto optimal rules.
2Strong-monotonicity in population is satisfied if hospitals prefer larger set of interns to smaller ones.
3See also Kojima (2006, 2007).
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under-reporting prevents the creation of harmful cycles of rejection. Under the intern-optimal stable rule,
capacity under-reporting engenders new cycles of rejection. Therefore, it is harder to manipulate. We prove
that manipulability of this rule needs that at least one hospital has non-monotonic preferences and it is
involved in multiple cycles. If none of such cycles exists the game yields the intern-optimal stable matching
at equilibrium and true capacity reporting is a dominant strategy. Furthermore, no weaker conditions can
be found.
The structure of the article is the following: in Section 2, we present the model, in Section 3 we present
the results and Section 4 concludes. The proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
An hospital-intern market is a quadruple (H, I, q, P ). The setH = {h1, ..., hm} is the set of hospitals,
I = {i1, ..., in} is the set of interns, q = (q1, ..., qm) is the vector of hospitals capacities where qh is the
capacity of hospital hospital h. FinallyP = (Ph1 , ..., Phm , Pi1 , ..., Pin) is the list of agents preferences, where
Ph is the preference of hospital h and Pi is the preferences of intern i.
For any h ∈ H, Ph is a linear order on 2I .4 Let I ′ ⊂ I be a set of interns. If ∅PhI ′ I ′ is unacceptable to i.
Otherwise I ′ is acceptable to h. A (h) denotes the set of interns who are individually acceptable to h. All along
the paper we assume that every hospital has responsive preferences. An hospital has responsive preferences if,
for any two assignments that differ in one intern only, it prefers the assignment containing the most preferred
intern. FormallyPh are responsive if for all J ⊆ I we have: (i) for all i, j ∈ I \ J , J ∪ {i}PhJ ∪ {j} ⇔ iPhj
and (ii) for all i ∈ I \J , J ∪{i}PhJ ⇔ i ∈ A (h). An hospital h has strong monotonic preferences if it prefers
group of acceptable interns of larger cardinality to sets of acceptable interns of smaller cardinality: if,f or all
J,K ⊂ A (h), ]J > ]K ⇒ JPhK.
For any i ∈ I, Pi is a linear order on H∪{i}. Any hospital i such that iPih is unacceptable to i. Otherwise
i is acceptable to i. For every i ∈ I, A (i) denotes the set of hospitals that are acceptable to i. For every
agent i ∈ H ∪ I let Rx be x’s weak preference relation.
A matching assigns each hospital h to a set of at most qh interns and assigns each intern to at most one
hospital. Formally, a matching is a function µ : H ∪ I → 2I ∪ I, such that, for every (h, i) ∈ H × I (i)
µ (h) ∈ 2I , (ii) ]µ (h) ≤ qh, (iii) µ (i) ∈ F ∪ {i}, (iv) iµ (i) = f ⇔ i ∈ µ(h).
We introduce two binary relations on the set of matchings, PH and PI . Let µ, ν be matchings. Let µPHν
if and only if and µ (h)Rh (h) for all h ∈ H and µ (h)Ph (h) for at least one h. Let µPIν if and only if
µ (i)Riν (i) for all i ∈ I and µ (i)Piν (i) for at least one i ∈ I. A matching µ is individually rational if (i)
µ (h)PhØ, ∀h ∈ H, (ii) µ (w)Rii ∀i∈ I. µ is blocked by the pair (h, i) ∈ H × I if (i) iPiµ (i), (i) ∃J ⊆ µ (h)
such that J ∪ {i}Phµ (h). Finally, µ is stable in (H, I, q, P ) if it is individually rational and if no pair blocks
it. Otherwise µ is unstable. Γ (I,H, q, P ) denotes the stable set, the set of matchings that are stable in market
(I,H, q, P ). If the hospitals have responsive preferences the stable set is not empty.
There is a stable matching, the hospital-optimal stable matching that is (weakly) preferred to any other
stable matching by every hospital. Another stable matching the intern-optimal stable matching is (weakly)
preferred to any other stable matching by every intern. We denote by ϕH (H, I, q, P ) and ϕI (H, I, q, P )
the hospital-optimal and the intern-optimal stable matching of (H, I, q, P ), respectively. When there is on
ambiguity we will use ϕH (q) and ϕI (q)instead than ϕH (H, I, q, P ) and ϕI (H, I, q, P ) , respectively.
The hospital-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley 1962) generates the hospital-optimal
stable matching of (H, I, q, P ) and intern-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm generates the the intern-
optimal stable matching of (H, I, q, P ).
4As usual, for all h,i, i′ , iPhi′, iPh∅ and ∅Phi denote {i}Ph {i′}, {i}Ph∅ and ∅Ph {i}, respectively.
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2.1 Capacity-reporting games
In a capacity reporting game, each hospital h simultaneously reports a capacity qh and the outcome is
determined according to ϕHor ϕI . Interns are passive players and information is complete. Let V ∈ {H, I}.
The capacity reporting game induced by ϕV is a normal form game of complete information. The set of
players is H and the strategy space of hospital h is {1, ..., qh} (see also Hurwicz et al 1995). The outcome
functions is ϕV . The preferences over outcomes are naturally induced by their preferences over subsets of
interns.
2.2 Cycles
We finally introduce the notion of cycle in agents preferences that generalizes the notion of common prefer-
ences presented in Konishi and U¨nver.
Definition 1 A cycle (of length T+1) is given by h0, ..., hTwith hl 6= hl+15 for i = 0, ...T and distinct
i0, i1, ..., iT such that
1. i0Ph0iTPhT iT−1....i1Ph1i0 ,
2. for every l, il+1 ∈ A (hl) ∩A (hl+1).
Hospitals preferences are acyclical if they have no cycles of length 2.
Assume that a cycle exists. If every il is initially assigned to hl+1 every hospital is willing willing to
exchange the its assigned interns with its successor.
Similarly.
Definition 2 A cycle (of length T + 1) in interns preferences is given by h0, ..., hT and i0, i1, ..., iT and
1. h0PiT hTPiT−1hT−1....h1Pi0h0.
2. for every l, hl ∈ A (il−1) ∩A (il).
Interns preferences are acyclical if they have no cycles of length 2.
Observe that under acyclicity the interests of one side of the market are almost aligned: if interns (resp.
hospitals) preferences are acyclical any two interns (resp. hospitals) have the same preferences over every
two hospitals (resp. interns) that are acceptable to both.
A simultaneous cycle is given by h = h0, ..., hT and i0, i1, ..., iT that constitute both a cycle in hospitals
and interns preferences.
We next define a generalized cycle.
Definition 3 A generalized cycle (of length T+1) at h is given by a cycle in interns preferencesh = h0, ..., hT ,
i0, i1, ..., iT and by i−1 such that: i0Ph0i−1Ph0iT . Hospitals preferences are weakly acyclical if, there is no
generalized cycle at any h.
5From now on indexes are considered modulo T + 1.
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I can be shown (see Ergin (2002)) that any generalized cycle can be reduced to a generalized cycle of
length 2. Assume that a generalized cycle of length 2 at h exists. Let h0 be assigned with two interns i−1 and
i1. and let h1be assigned with i0. Assume also that i0Ph {i−1, i1}. Hospital h0 would be willing to exchange
its two interns for i0 only and h1 would accept the proposal (maybe hiring i1 only). 6
Definition 4 A non-monotonic cycle at h is given by M,M ′ ⊆ I, with ]M < ]M ′ such that:
1. M ′PhM
2. Let M ′ \M = {i1, ..., is}. For k = 1, ..., s there is a generalized cycle at h, hk0 , ..., hkTk , ik−1, ik0 , ik1 , ..., ikTk ,
T k ≥ 1 such that ik = ik0 and ik−1, ikT s ∈M \M ′.
3. For k 6= k′, ikl 6= ik
′
l′ for all l = 0, ...T
k, l′ = 0, ...., T k
′
.
3 A look to Nash Equilibrium
The literature on capacity manipulation games has devoted a lot of attention to strong-monotonicity in
population.7
While intuitively linked to capacity manipulation, the notion of strong monotonicity does not guarantees
the stability of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium outcomes in the under the hospital-optimal rule.
Example 1 There are two hospitals h1, h2 and two interns i1, i2. LetPh1 : i1, i2 andPh2 : i2, i1. LetPi1 :
h2, h1 and letPi2 = h1, h2. Then there are cycles in interns and in hospitals preferences. When quotas are
(2, 2) , (1, 2) (2, 1) , the unique stable matching is
µ1
h1 h2
{i2} {i1}
When quotas are (1, 1) the hospital-optimal stable matchings is
µ2
h1 h2
{i1} {i2}
When quotas is (2, 2) the capacities revelation game induced by ϕH has two Nash Equilibrium, (1, 1) and
(2, 2). The former yields µ2 as outcome which is blocked by (h1, i1). The latter yields the hospital-optimal
stable matching.
When hospitals state their true capacities, each intern will receive the offers of both hospitals, along the
deferred acceptance algorithm. She can choose her favorite hospital and every hospital hires its worst intern.
When both hospitals understate their capacities each one makes an offer to its favorite intern, only. Each
intern accepts it so each hospital can hire its favorite intern. Observe that the equilibrium outcome of the
game induced by the intern-optimal stable matching is stable.
3.1 General Results
The presence of cycles in agents preferences makes capacity manipulation profitable. Under acyclicity stating
the true capacities is dominant strategy for hospitals. All Nash equilibria yields stable matchings. Further-
more, the set of stable matchings is a singleton, a result that extends Eeckhout 1999. The result holds under
both rules.
6An alternative interpretation is provided in Ergin (2002), who prove that if a generalized cycle exists then the intern-optimal
stable rule is not Pareto optimal for interns.
7Every counterexample in Konishi and U¨nver (2006) and in Sönmez (1997b) use non-strong monotonic preferences and
involves at least three interns.
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The first preliminary result links instability of Nash equilibrium outcomes and incentives to capacity
manipulation.
Lemma 1 Let q be a Nash Equilibrium of the capacity revelation game induced by ϕV at (H, I, q∗, P ). If h
belongs to a pair blocking ϕV (q), then ϕVh (q)Phϕ
V (q∗h, q−h).
It turns out that if some hospital has incentive to understate its capacity a simultaneous cycle exists.
Lemma 2 If ϕVh (q)Phϕ
V (q∗h, q−h) for some h and some qh > q
∗
h there exists a simultaneous cycle.
.
Theorem 1 Assume that no simultaneous cycle exist. Then:
1. Stating the true capacities is a dominant strategy under ϕV .
2. The stable set of (H, I, q, P ) is a singleton for every q.
3. The capacity revelation games induced by ϕH and by ϕI have the same pure strategy Nash Equilibrium
outcome for every q: the unique stable matching of (H, I, q, P ).
Checking the existence of cycles of any possible length is very complex. But any cycle can be reduced to
a cycle of length 2.
Lemma 3 Let h = h0, ..., hT and i0, i1, ..., iT , T ≥ 1 be such that hk 6= hk+1 and ik 6= ik+1.
1. If i0Ph0i−1Ph0iTPhT iT−1....i1Ph1i0 hospitals preferences have a cycle of length 2.
2. If h0PiT hTPiT−1hT−1....h1Pi0h0, interns preferences have a cycle of length 2.
Unfortunately, it is not true that any simultaneous cycle can be reduced to a simultaneous cycle of length
2 as the reader can easily check. From Theorem 1 and Lemma 3 follows a more operative result.
Corollary 1 Assume that either the preferences of the hospitals or the preference of the interns are acyclical.
Then
1. Stating the true capacities is a dominant strategy under ϕV .
2. The stable set of (H, I, q, P ) is a singleton for every q.
3. The capacity revelation games induced by ϕH and by ϕI have the same Nash Equilibrium outcome for
every q: the unique stable matching of (H, I, q, P ).
In particular, the result holds when the interests of one side of the market are aligned ( Theorem 6 and
7 in Konishi and U¨nver 2006).
If we restrict our attention to the hospital-optimal mechanism, acyclicity is the weakest condition guar-
anteeing that stating the true capacities is a dominant strategy and that every Nash Equilibrium yields a
(unique) stable matching. It can also be stated as a maximal domain result.
Proposition 1 The domain of acyclical preferences is the maximal one that guarantees 1, 2, and 3.
1. Assume that hospitals preferences have a cycle. There exists a vector of interns preferences such that
the capacity revelation game induced by ϕH has an unstable Nash Equilibrium outcome.
2. Assume that interns preferences have a cycle. There exists a vector of hospitals preferences such that
the capacity revelation game induced by ϕH has an unstable Nash Equilibrium outcome.
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3.2 The intern-optimal stable matching
The game induced by the intern-optimal matching is more resistant to manipulation via capacities (see also
Example 1) First of all, in order to manipulate the intern optimal stable matching there is at least three
interns are needed. The result is straightforward. Consider the case where at least one hospital has quota
two. If there the two interns are assigned to only one hospital this hospital cannot benefit from rejecting one
of them because preferences are responsive. If the interns are assigned to two different hospitals, reducing
capacities does not affect the outcome of the game.
Result 1 If there are only two interns the capacity revelation game induced by ϕI yields the intern-optimal
stable matching as Nash equilibrium outcome.
The next example provides the basic intuition that explains how the intern-optimal stable rule can result
in unstable matchings.
Example 2 Let I = {i1, i2, i3, i4} , H = {h1, h2}.
Let Ph1 be such that {i1, i2, i3}Ph1 {i1, i2}Ph1 {i1, i3}Ph1i1Ph1 {i2, i3}Ph1i2Ph1i3Ph1i4, let Ph2 be strongly
monotonic in population and such that i4Ph2i3Ph2i2Ph2i1. Let Pi1 = h2h1, Pi2 = h1h2,Pi3 = h1h2 and
Pi4 =h2h1 . There is a non-monotonic cycle at h1: i1Ph1 {i2, i3}, i1Ph1i3Ph1i2Ph2i1. When the capacity is
(2, 2) the intern-optimal stable matching is
µ1
h1 h2
{i2, i3} {i1, i4}
When the capacity is (1, 2) the intern-optimal stable matching is
µ2
h1 h2
{i1} {i3, i4} .
When the capacity is (2, 2) the unique Nash Equilibrium under the intern-optimal rule matching is (1, 2),
which yields an unstable matching, µ2.
If h1 states her true capacity it only receives the offer by i2 and i3 and it never receives an offer by i1
during the the intern-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. If it understates its capacity, at the first stage
of the deferred acceptance algorithm it rejects the offer by i3 . At the second stage of the deferred acceptance
algorithm i3 applies to h2 and induces the rejection of i1 by h2. Finally h1 receives the offer by i1 and rejects
i2. Non-monotonicity of h1’s preferences is necessary to generate the instability. The generalized cycle at h1
makes it possible the chain of rejections.
There is an important difference between the manipulation of the hospital-optimal stable matching and the
manipulation of the interns optimal stable matching. In the former case by understating capacities hospitals
restrain from applying to some interns (in the deferred acceptance algorithm) and prevents potential cycles of
rejections of hospitals by interns. In the latter by understating capacities they generate a chain of rejections
of interns by hospitals. Some hospitals will receive more offers from interns, but they will be able to cover
less positions, which makes non-monotonic preferences necessary for manipulation.
Proposition 2 Assume that no non-monotonic cycle exists. Then:
1. Stating the true capacities is a dominant strategy under ϕI .
2. The capacity revelation game induced by ϕI yields the intern-optimal stable matching at equilibrium.
In particular if preferences are strongly monotonic in population no non-monotonic cycle exists and the
result implies Theorem 5 in Konishi and U¨nver (2006).
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Corollary 2 Under the following conditions stating the true capacity is a dominant strategy in capacity
revelation game induced by ϕI . The game yields the intern optimal stable matching at every Nash equilibrium.
1. The preferences of the hospitals are strongly monotonic in population.
2. The maximum length of every preference cycle is two.
The absence of non-monotonic cycles is the minimal condition able to prevent capacity manipulation and
equilibrium instabilities under ϕI . The same applies to the profile of interns preferences having only cycle of
length less than 3.
Proposition 3 1. If a non-monotonic cycle exists there is a profile of interns preferences and a vector of
capacities q such that the capacity reporting game yields an unstable matching at equilibrium.
2. If interns preferences have a cycle of length at least 3, there exists a profile of hospitals preferences
and and a vector of capacities q such that the capacity reporting game yields an unstable matching at
equilibrium.
4 Conclusions
In the paper we have considered two capacity manipulation games using the intern-optimal and the hospital
optimal-stable rules. Generalizing Konishi and U¨nver (2006) we have provided minimal conditions that
guarantee existence and stability of pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes and the strategy-proofness of
truthful capacity revelation. We have also underlined the difference between the two mechanisms.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Let q be a Nash Equilibrium when the quota vector is q∗ and let µ = ϕV (q) be the
outcome matching. Assume µ is unstable. Let (h, j) blocking µ and set µ∗ = ϕV (q∗h, q−h). It must be the
case that qh < q∗h otherwise (h, j) would block µ in (H, I, P, q). For the same reason ]µ (h) = qh. Consider the
related one-to-one matching market. From Proposition 2 in Gale and Sotomayor (1985b) it follows that µ∗RIµ
and µ (h′c)Rhcµ∗ (h′c) for every h′ 6= h and µ (hc)Rµ∗ (hc) for every hcsuch that µ (hc) 6= hc . Furthermore,
µ (h)Rhµ∗ (h) because q is a Nash Equilibrium andµ 6= µ∗because µ is unstable (H, I, P, (q∗h, q−h)). So µPHµ∗
andµ∗PIµ. Finally µ (h)Phµ∗ (h), otherwise (h, j) would block µ in (H, I, q, P ).
Proof of Lemma 3: We prove only 1, the proof of 2 being identical. Let T be the largest T satisfy-
ing i0Ph0i−1Ph0iTPhT iT−1....i1Ph1i0. By contradiction assume T > 1. We prove that the cycle can be
reduced to one of length at most T − 1. If i0Ph2i1, then i0Ph2i1Ph1j0 a contradiction. If i1Ph2i0, then
i0Ph0j0PhT−1iT−1......i2Ph2i0 and we have a cycle of length T − 1, a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 1: 1. Let h ∈ H. Let qh < q∗h and let q−h be a vector of capacities for the other
hospitals. Set µ = ϕV (q) and set µ∗ = ϕV (q∗h, q−h). Assume that µ (h)Phµ
∗ (h). Proposition 2 in Gale and
Sotomayor (1985b) (applied to the related one-to-one matching market) implies that µ∗PIµ and µPHµ∗ and
that for all h′ such that µ (h′) 6= µ∗ (h′), for all i ∈ µ (h′′) \ µ∗ (h′) and for all j ∈ µ∗ (h′) \ µ (h′), iPh′j.
Set I ′ = {i : µ∗ (i)Piµ (i)} 6= Ø. Let h0 ∈ µ (I ′), then µ (h0)Pµ∗ (h0) and let i0 ∈ µ (h0) \ µ∗ (h0), i0 ∈ I ′.
For all n ≥ 1 set hn+1 = µ∗ (in+1) if hn 6= ht for every t < n and set hn+1 = hn otherwise. Observe that
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h0 6= h1. Let in = maxPn−1µ (hn−1) \ (µ∗ (hn−1) ∪ {i1, ..., in−1}) if µ∗ (hn−1) ∪ {i1, ..., in−1} + µ (hn−1)
and set in+1 = in otherwise . The sequence is stationary because I ′ is finite and it stops with at some
n¯ > 1 such that hn = hn+1. Let k be the such that hk = hn. Set jn = jn+k and rn = hn+kfor every
n ≤ n − k. The sequence is made of different interns and two consecutive hospitals are distinct. It satisfies
µ (jn) = rn = µ∗ (jn+1) for n ≤ n− k, and µ∗ (jk) = r0. It follows that (i) j0Pr0jkPrk−1jk−1......j2Pr2j1Pr1j0
and (ii) r0PjkrkPjkrk−1...Pj0r0 . So h0, ...hk, r0, ...rk are a simultaneous cycle.
2. Let µ, µ∗ be different stable matchings of (H, I, q, P ) for some q and assume that µPHµ∗. Set I ′ =
{i : µ∗ (i)Piµ (i)}6= Ø. The proof of the existence of simultaneous cycles is exactly like in 1.
3. From 1 a Nash equilibrium yielding a stable matching exists. From Lemma 1 and 1 the game does not
yields unstable matchings at equilibrium. From 2 such outcome is unique.
Proof of Proposition 1: 1. Let h1, h2, i1, i2 be like in Definition 1 . Define a profile of preferences
for interns preferences as follows. Let h2Pi1h1Pi2h2 and let A (i1) = A (i2) = {h1, h2}. Let P ′I′\{i1,i2} be
any vector of preferences. Consider the market
(
H \ {h1, h2} , I \ {i1, i2} , q−{h1,h2}, PH\{h1,h2}, P ′I′\{i1,i2}
)
and let µ′ be the hospital optimal stable matching. Let PI\{i1,i2} such that A (i) = µ(i)for every i ∈ I .
When qh1 = qh2 = 2 the market (H, I, q, P )has a unique stable matching: µ (i) = µ′ (i) for every i 6= i1, i2,
µ (i1) = h2, µ(i2) = h1. It is easily seen that when q =
(
2, 2, q−{h1,h2}
)
, the message
(
1, 1, q−{h1,h2}
)
is a Nash
Equilibrium. The outcome matching is µ∗, where µ∗ (i) = µ′ (i) for every i 6= i1, i2, µ∗ (i1) = h1, µ∗(i2) = h2,
and is blocked by (h1, i2) and (h2, i1) . The proof of 2 is similar.
Proof of Proposition 2: 1. Let h ∈ H. Let qh < q∗h and let q−h be a vector of capacities for the other
hospitals. Set µ = ϕI (q) and set µ∗ = ϕI (q∗h, q−h). Assume that µ (h)Phµ
∗ (h). Proposition 2 in Gale and
Sotomayor (1985) implies that µ∗PIµ and, in the associated one-to one matching market µ (h′c)Rhcµ∗ (h′c)
for every h′ 6= h that and µ (hc)Rµ∗hc (hc) for every hcsuch that µ (hc) 6= hc. It follows that for every h such
that µ (h) 6= µ∗ (h), for all i ∈ µ (h) \µ∗ (h) and for all j ∈ µ∗ (h) \µ (h), iPhj otherwise (h, j)would block µ∗
in market (H, I, (q∗h, q−h, )P ). There is no loss of generality in assuming that µ
∗ (i) is i’s favorite firm, for
very i ∈ I, because µPHµ∗ and µP ∗I µ. Consider the deferred acceptance algorithm where interns apply with
quotas q. Let i the first intern to be rejected by µ∗ (i) = h′. It must be the case that i is rejected in favor of
some intern in µ∗ (h′). It follows that ]µ (h′) < ]µ∗ (h′) and that h = h′ so h’ preferences are not monotonic.
Also, µ (h)PHµ∗ (h).
Set M ′ = µ (h) and set M ′ =µ∗ (h). Let M ′ \M = {i1, ..., is} and let M \M ′ = {j1, ..., jq} . Set r =
]M − ]M ′ = ]M − qh. We have assumed that µ∗ (i) is i’s favorite hospital. Then µ∗ (i) is the first firm i
proposes to in the deferred acceptance algorithm. So it must be the case that exactly r interns are rejected
by h at the first stage of the deferred acceptance algorithm. Furthermore r < q, otherwise during the
deferred acceptance algorithm no other intern in M ′ would be rejected by h and h would end up with
M ′ = M \ {j1, ..., jr}, a contradiction. Assume that such intern are jq−r+1, ..., jq.
Consider i11 = i1. Let t0 > 1 the step at which i11 has been accepted by h and let i1 be an intern that has
been rejected in favor of it. If i1 ∈ M stop and set it−1 = i11, otherwise at stept1, 1 < t1 < t0, i1 has been
accepted and some i2 has been rejected in favor of i11. For all k ≥ 2, If ik ∈ M stop, at step tk, 1 < tk < t0,
ikhas been accepted by hand some ik+1 has been rejected by h in favor of ik+1. The sequence eventually
stop at some iK1 ∈M who has been rejected in a step tK1 > 1 of the deferred acceptance algorithm.8 There
is no loss of generality in assuming that iK1 = j1. We have i1Phj1. Fort ≥ 2, define iK2as before, but choose
any itk 6= ils for every l < t. It can be done because if at the same stage (after the first one) of the deferred
acceptance algorithm p interns are accepted by h then p who were engaged to h are rejected. So iKt 6= iKl if
8Every intern in the sequence is rejected because of the arrival of a proposal from another intern.
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t 6= l. There is no loss of generality in assuming that it−1 = jt for t = 1, ..., s, because every it−1 has been
rejected at a step of the deferred acceptance algorithm successive to the first one.
For t = 1, ..., s set it0 = it. Let it1 be the intern in favor of which it0 has been rejected by µ∗ (it0) = ht1. For
every p ≥ 1 at step tp of the deferred acceptance algorithm jtp has been rejected by htp+1 = µ∗
(
jtp
) 6= htp
in favor of some jtp+1 /∈ µ∗
(
htp
)
i1. If hsp = hs
′
l and t
t
p = t
t′
l for some t
′ < t then htp has received at least
]
{
t′ < t : htp = h
t′
l for some l and t
t
p = t
t′
l
}
+1 better proposal than jtp. So we can choose jtp different from
every other jt
′
l , 0 ≤ t′ < t. We have htp+1 = µ∗
(
itp
)
for all t, htp+1Pithtp9 and itpPhtp+1i
t
p. The sequence
stops at some Kt where htKt = h rejects some some intern at the first stage of the algorithm. Then,
there h ∈ H,M,M ′, satisfy ]M < ]M ′ M ′PhM and hk0 , ..., hkTk , ik−10, ik0 , ik1 , ..., ikKt with Kt ≥ 1 such that
h = hk0 , i
k = ik0 , ik−1, ikT s ∈M \M ′ and ik−1 6= ik
′
−1, for k 6= k′. Then there is a non-monotonic cycle at h.
2. By 1 a Nash equilibrium yielding a stable matching exists. By Lemma 1 there are not unstable equilibria,
so every equilibrium outcome is stable. By contradiction assume that the outcome is not the intern optimal
stable matching. It must be the case that some hospital has misrepresented capacity. Let q be the Nash
equilibrium of the game and let q∗ ≥ q be the true capacity vector. Set µ = ϕI (q) and set µ∗ = ϕI (q∗).
From 1 µ is stable in (H, I, q∗, P ) so µPHµ∗ and µ∗PIµ. There is no loss of generality in assuming that µ∗ (i)
is intern i’s favorite hospital. The matching µ is obtained through the intern-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm. It must be the case that at least one i is rejected by µ∗ (i) = h at the first stage of the deferred
acceptance algorithm. Because every intern applies to her hospital under µ∗ at this stage it is because h has
manipulated its true capacity. Then h has less interns under µ than under µ∗. This yields a contradiction
because both matching are stable in (H, I, q∗, P ).
Proof of Proposition 3: 1. Assume that there is a non-monotonic cycle at h. Using the notation of
definition 4 let I ′ =
{
i1Tk : h
k
l = h
} ∩M ′ ∪ {i1−1, ...., is−1}. Set M∗ = M ′ ∩M ∪ I ′. Note that ]M∗ > ]M
and MPhM∗. Set the preferences of interns as follows. Let A
(
ikl
)
=
{
hkl , h
k
l+1
}
and hkl+1Phkh
k
l for all k
and for all l. Let A (i) = {h} if i ∈ M ′ ∩ M . For all other interns let A (i) = {h (i)} for some h (i) /∈{
hkl : k = 1, ...s, l = 1, ...T
k
}
. Let qh0 = qh = ]M∗ and let qhkl = 1 for all k, l such that h
k
l 6= h. Set all
other capacities arbitrarily. We have ϕIh (q) = M
∗. From the property of the non-monotonic cycle at h,
ϕIh (q
′
h, q−h)RhMPhM
∗. Let q′h be h’s best response to q−h. We have q
′
h < qh. It is easily seen that (q
′
h, q−h)
is a Nash equilibrium at (H, I, q, P ). It yields a matching that is unstable because in any stable matching of
(H, I, q, P ) h is matched to ]M∗ > q′h interns.
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